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ABSTRACT

Lee, Yongjin. M.S., Purdue University, December 2014. The Effects of Acquisition on
Restaurant Firms’ Performance: Different-Sector versus Same-Sector Acquisitions.
Major Professor: Chun-Hung (Hugo) Tang.
This study examines the postacquisition accounting performance of acquiring
firms in the restaurant industry between 1992 and 2012. Specifically, this study
investigates the effects of different-sector and same-sector restaurants acquisitions
between full-service and limited-service restaurants on restaurant firms’ performance.
Additionally, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and regression model are used to examine
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) for the accounting performance of the
acquiring restaurants.
The ROA and ROE reveal that the profitability is significantly negative up to 5
years after firms are acquired. However, negative effects are strongest within the first
year after acquisition and decrease until 4 years after compared with previous years. After
4 years, the negative effects turn to positive compared to the previous year for ROA and
ROE changes.
Further, the study reveals that the difference between different-sector and same-sector
acquisitions indicates no significant relationship between ROA and ROE changes during
all 5-year periods. Overall, this study shows that the effects of acquisitions between
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different sectors and the same sector are negative and there is no significant difference
between them.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Introduction

During the early 1950s, the restaurant industry emerged as one of the fastestdeveloping industries in the United States. Total sales growth increased from US$42.8
billion to an estimated US$586.7 billion between 1970 and 2010, which represents an
annual average sale growth rate of about 32% (National Restaurant Association, 2010).
Total sales growth was predicted to be US$683.4 billion by 2014 (National Restaurant
Association, 2013).
Due to severe market saturation and low entry barriers, restaurant firms constantly
need to pursue fast-growing strategies to survive and maintain competitiveness.
Restaurant firms’ compulsion to grow quickly may be reflected in the merger and
acquisition (M&A) phenomenon during the last decade. The restaurant industry
experienced considerable M&A activity in the 1990s (Chatfield, Dalbor, & Ramdeen,
2011), and the Chapman Group (2008) reported that 78 M&A transactions occurred
among restaurant firms in 2003. That number increased to 112 in 2007. However, the
M&A restaurant waves began earlier in 1985 (Harford, 2005).
Conventional wisdom often considers M&As an effective growth strategy (Hsu &
Jang, 2007) since efficient execution replaces the acquired firm’s inefficient resources
with the acquiring firm’s superior resources (Trautwein, 1990). Montgomery and Singh
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(1984) explained that M&As can increase market power and increased market power
leads to more excess returns when a company has the ability to influence the price,
quantity, and quality of products in the marketplace. Kiymaz (2004) also suggested that
M&As contribute to growth, market expansion, and lower financing costs. However,
acquisitions are not necessarily an effective tool for producing consistent growth in
restaurant firms. Enormous barriers must be controlled to realize faster growth.
Acquisitions involve a time-consuming process, and the real chemical integration
required to achieve synergy is hard to accomplish (David & Singh, 1994). For example,
the degree of the relatedness of the two firms, both operationally and culturally, varies
among the acquiring and target firms, which affects the success of the M&A (Canina,
Kim, & Ma, 2010). The target firm’s and the acquiring firm’s financial conditions, size,
and location and the type of deal are also closely related to the success of the M&A (Kim
& Olsen, 1999). Further, the duration of the M&A effect is still controversial, even after
the transaction has been completed (Park & Jang, 2011; Yang, Qu, & Gu, 2009). Thus,
most researchers have identified negative M&A effects for acquiring firms in the
hospitality industry in contrast to conventional M&A benefits (Hsu & Jang, 2007; Canina
et al., 2010; Chatfield & Delbor, 2011).
However, since previous studies examined the effect of M&As from only the
financial perspective, the results might be too limited to fully understand the various
effects of M&As on firm performance in the restaurant industry. Additionally, in terms of
the effect of M&As on firm performance, several studies have revealed that M&As had a
positive influence on the acquiring and target firms in the lodging industry (Canina, 2001;
Kim & Canina, 2013; Yang et al., 2009). Scholars did not fully explain U.S. restaurant
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firms’ use of M&As as a growth strategy since from 1992 to 2012 many restaurants
extended their businesses through M&As. Therefore, more specific research models must
be developed to understand restaurant firms’ post-M&A benefits along with the increased
M&A transactions.
In the restaurant industry, M&As occur between restaurants. In this industry,
restaurants are divided into two categories: full service and limited service. There are
distinctive differences in financial characteristics between full-service and limited-service
restaurants in terms of their financial and operational resources (Gu, 1993; Petraf, 1993;
Tse & Olsen, 1988; Walker & Johnson, 2002). The varying financial and operational
resources influence restaurants’ accounting performance differently (McCool & Gu 1993;
Youn & Gu, 2010). For example, the degree of standardization of the restaurant operation
process, the level of employee skill, advertisement expense, and food costs are quite
different between full-service and limited-service restaurants. Therefore, investigating the
effects of acquisition is important to understand which types of acquisitions between fullservice and limited-service restaurants improve accounting performance.
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the effects of acquisition on firms’
accounting performance among different restaurant sectors. The study categorizes
acquisitions into two distinctive types, which are different-sector (full-service or limitedservice restaurants acquire limited-service or full-service restaurants) and same-sector
acquisitions (full-service or limited-service restaurants acquire full-service or limitedservice restaurants), since each restaurant sector has different operating and financing
characteristics.
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This study investigates the effects of acquisitions on the firm performance of the
restaurant industry by comparing the two sectors. Consequently, this study tries to
identify the different postacquiring accounting performance between different-sector and
same-sector acquisitions and suggest which types of acquisition are better for the
acquiring firms’ profitability (return on assets [ROA] and return on equity [ROE]).

1.2

Study Objectives and Research Questions

The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of acquisitions on restaurant
firms and to compare the performances of the restaurant sectors. Generally, restaurants
are classified as full-service and limited-service restaurants. Acquisitions between fullservice restaurants and limited-service restaurants are classified as different-sector and
same-sector sector acquisitions. When a full-service restaurant acquires a limited-service
restaurant, the acquisition is identified as a different-sector acquisition because the
acquisition occurs in a different sector. When a full-service restaurant acquires a fullservice restaurant, the acquisition is identified as a same-sector acquisition because the
acquisition occurs in the same sector. In addition, the acquisition is related to resourcebased views of the firm because each sector has different resources.
An analytical framework that will improve industry participants’ understanding of
acquisitions among different segments of restaurants and the influence of strategic
decisions on the firm’s performance connection is proposed. The following research
questions focused this study: (a) Does the postacquisition period of acquiring other
restaurants significantly influence accounting performance? (b) Which type of
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acquisition, different sector or same sector, more significantly influences firm
performance? The study questions are shown in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1. Types of Restaurant Acquisitions
Acquisitions
Different-sector acquisitions
Full-service
Restaurant
Type

Limitedservice

Full-service restaurants
acquire limited-service
restaurants
Limited-service restaurants
acquires full-service
restaurants

1.3

Same-sector acquisitions
Full-service restaurants
acquire full-service restaurants
Limited-service restaurants
acquire limited-service
restaurants

Justification

Before firm accounting performance is examined through acquisitions, the
restaurant industry must be evaluated in terms of the differences between restaurant
sectors as a whole. Several studies have suggested that restaurants differ across sectors in
terms of organizational environment and financial performance. In limited-service
restaurants, standardization of food such as taste, packing, and operating system is higher
than in full-service restaurants (National Restaurant Association, 2010). Walker and
Johnson (2002) reported that full-service restaurants are more labor intensive than
limited-service restaurants. The researchers also suggested that the labor costs of fullservice restaurants are higher than those of limited-service restaurants. Gu and McCool
(1993) showed that inventory turnover and debt financing differ between full-service and
limited-service restaurants. Full-service restaurants have lower advertisement expenses
than limited-service restaurants. Additionally, the Franchise Finance Corporation of
America (FFCA; 2001) showed that full-service restaurants spent about half the
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percentage of their sales on advertising compared with limited-service restaurants.
Limited-service restaurants are more robust in economic or market downturns than fullservice restaurants (FFCA, 2001). Thus, the sectors’ resources differ.
Acquisition is one diversification strategy and can be followed by theoretical
resource-based views. In other words, the effects of acquisition on the restaurant sectors
might differently influence a firm’s operating performance depending on whether the
acquisition is made in different sectors or the same sector because different or similar
resources are combined in an acquisition. Although many scholars have asserted that the
advantages and disadvantages depend on the diversification strategy and the acquisition
itself, recently, only a few studies on restaurant sectors have shown their different
financing and operating characteristics. Several scholars have suggested that acquisitions
affect firm performance in the restaurant industry. However, the effects of acquisitions
between restaurant sectors are likely to differently influence firm performance based on a
resource-based view.
The purposes of this study are to investigate the effects of acquisition on firm
performance over the 1992 through 2012 period and to analyze the accounting
performance of the two restaurant sectors. To further identify the effects of acquisitions
on firm performance, the effects between restaurant sectors must be compared. Because
an acquisition is directly related to the act of a combining different or same resources to
form a single firm, an investigation of differences related to the type of acquisition could
be important in terms of expanding practical knowledge and contributing to acquisitions
between restaurant sectors.
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The study findings may help investors and managers better understand the return
features of various types of restaurants and assess investment opportunities in different
sectors of the restaurant industry. From these performance comparisons, restaurant
executives many also find useful suggestions for implementing strategies that could help
improve the firm performance of the acquisitions, and thus maximize shareholders’
wealth and firm profitability.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

Overview of M&As

Finance scholars have investigated various M&A waves with increasing scale,
growth, and geographic diversification. Becketti (1986) reported that the Great Merger
wave rapidly increased for monopolies in 1890s. The main purpose of the M&A wave
was to stabilize prices by removing competitors rather than gaining economies of scale
(Lamoreaux, 1988). The second wave occurred in the 1920s so oligopolies could hold the
most market power in their own industries. Although the M&A trend emerged in
horizontal consolidations in the same market (Becketti, 1986), the trend was economies
of scale (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008).
In the 1960s, the third wave was initiated by antitrust laws and firms’ movements
toward diversification (Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). The antitrust laws decreased M&A
activity in the same industry and increased conglomerate M&A activity in different
industries (Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). Firms in the 1960s generally used merger and
acquisition strategies to enter new markets, which is unrelated diversification
(Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003). Unrelated diversification was expected to decrease the
risks of volatile cash inflow as a means of developing firm value (Copeland, Weston, &
Shastri, 2004; Montgomery, 1994). Acquirers created managerial synergy by obtaining
management know-how from target firms (Matsusaka, 1993).
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However, the low performance of the conglomerates’ divisions resulted in
ineffective management (Shelifer & Vishny, 1991), which triggered a fourth wave of
M&As in the 1980s. Firms then focused on their main businesses, which is called related
diversification (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001; Bhagat, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990).
In addition, deregulatory reforms allowed firms to make horizontal M&As (Martynova &
Renneboog, 2008).
Last, M&A activity was more sophisticated and more geographically dispersed
between 1993 and 2001 (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). M&As opened up the global
market in terms of product, service, and capital, which drove cross-border M&As
(Andrade et al., 2001).

2.1.1

Motivations for M&A Activity

M&A scholars have proposed numerous motivations for why firms perform
M&As. Generally, scholars categorize firms’ motivations into four areas: market context,
managerial power, environmental factors, and firm characteristics.
First, finance scholars have investigated the impact of market power due to
increasing firm-level pricing and power because firms gain a small part of their sales in
the competitive market segment. M&As helped increase market power for firms. In
addition, economists suggested that M&As were motivated by the desire to increase
efficiency. Firms made related diversifications or unrelated diversifications to improve
their efficient productivity. Agency researchers reported M&As help shareholders
minimize losses from poor management.
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Second, finance and management researchers have also suggested that industries
with higher chief executive officer (CEO) compensation generally show increased
acquisition activity (Agrawal & Walkling, 1994). M&A deals are highly related to CEO
compensation (Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997; Datta, Iskandar-Datta,
& Raman, 2001; Rose & Shepard, 1994). Additionally, firms increase CEOs’ power and
wealth, which can establish managers and decrease their employment risk (Gomez-Mjia
& Wiseman, 1997; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).
Managerial power was closely tied to shareholder returns to align managers’ and
shareholders’ interest.
Third, strategic management researchers have investigated whether the fit
between environmental factors and a firm’s strategy stimulates acquisitions.
Environmental uncertainty encourages firms to acquire other firms to decrease
uncertainty. Highly diversified firms tended to create more M&As (Bergh & Lawless,
1998). In addition, finance management scholars have suggested regulation influenced
the likelihood of acquisitions (Beneish, Jansen, Lewis, & Stuart, 2008).
Last, the management literature has supported the influence of firm characteristics
on M&As. Baum, Li, and Usher (2000) reported that firms acquire other corporations that
were geographically and organizationally similar. Further, firms that have more
acquisition experience tend to have an increased likelihood of acquiring firms
(Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, & Noorderhaven, 2002). In the finance area, many scholars
have widely investigated the impact of M&As on performance relationships such as deal
characteristics, managerial effects, financing and accounting performance, and
environmental elements.

11
2.1.2

Review of M&A Studies in the Hospitality Industry

Although M&As has been examined with various strategies, few researchers have
addressed M&A trends in the hospitality industry. Most scholars have shown that the
returns to the merger participants fluctuated over time. Jensen and Ruback (1983)
suggested that corporate takeovers generated positive gains and found that the target
firms gained positive returns. Andrew (1988) empirically measured most of the impact of
acquisitions on a hospitality firm’s value. He found that acquirers lost value during the 20
days before the acquisition was announced. In contrast, target firms gained value during
the same period; however, the size of the additional wealth gained was skewed upward.
Kwansa (1994) estimated the size of the additional wealth gained by the equity holders of
lodging firms acquired in the 1980s. He reported that the bulk of the additional wealth
was created 2 days before and after an acquisition was announced. Enz, Canina, and
Walsh (2001) investigated abnormal returns for lodging firms’ acquirers from 2 days
before through the day after a merger was announced (–2, +1) between 1982 and 1999.
The researchers found that lodging industry acquirers received positive abnormal returns
on the day the merger was announced, but not before or after the announcement. Hsu and
Jang (2007) asserted that most postmerger financial performances of acquiring firms in
the lodging industry showed no significant relationship between the merger
announcement and the change in short-term equity value, but M&As showed a
significantly negative ROA and ROE after the merger for 5 years. Chatfield et al. (2011)
suggested that acquiring firms have positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) except
1 day before the announcement and the announcement day, but target firms have positive
CARs for the same period. Sheel and Nagpal (2000) reported the effect of M&As
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between the short term and the long term was not significant or negative from 1980 to
2000. However, Yang et al. (2009) asserted that acquiring hospitality firms had
significantly higher abnormal returns 12 months after mergers. Park and Jang (2011)
investigated whether acquiring restaurant firms experienced higher growth in sales
volumes than nonacquiring restaurant firms over a year; however, the effect of the M&A
was not consistent after 1 year.
In addition, the types of payment for M&As have rarely been studied in the
hospitality industry because the payment method can significantly influence the returns
for M&A participants. Acquirers have a choice among cash, stock, or a combination of
both. Oak, Andrew, and Bryant (2008) suggested that debt ratio, capital expenditure ratio,
and firm size are important for deciding the appropriate finance method for an M&A.
They found that cash deals were preferred for M&As in the hospitality industry.
Recently, Chatfield, Chatfield, and Dalbor (2012) found that cash financing was
significantly positive for earning abnormal returns in the lodging, restaurant, and gaming
industries. However, when acquiring firms used mixed cash and stocks, the effect of the
abnormal returns was insignificant.

2.2

Costs of Acquisitions

Acquisitions separate management from ownership in modern multiowner
corporations. Firms make acquisitions even when the managerial cost of the acquisition is
higher than the marginal growth in the value of the firm (Barle & Means, 1932; Baumol,
1959; Mueller, 1969; Williamson, 1975). Some researchers suggested that even though
better outcomes are related to choosing a better target, negotiating a better financial deal,
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and successfully sharing strategic fit and organizational fit may depend on the
characteristics of the process for making acquisition decisions. Acquisition decisions are
distinguished from other strategic decisions because of the risk characteristics related to
some degree of uncertainty (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991), and the uncertainty is
associated with acquisition outcomes. The high rate of failed acquisitions demonstrates
the significant potential for loss (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Additionally,
acquisitions have high levels of risk for decision makers because of the visibility and
tendency of acquisitions to induce intense personal commitment (Haunschild, DavisBlake, & Fichman, 1994). Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) suggested that the returns
to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies, when it buys a quickly
growing target, and when its managers performed poorly before the acquisition.
Generally, scholars have become concerned with developing a better
understanding of the cost of specific acquisitions. In studies, the cost of acquisitions is
commonly explained in terms of three categories: deal characteristics, firm
characteristics, and negative returns. King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004) asserted that
managers finance acquisitions with cash when the managers recognize their firms are
undervalued and with stock when managers recognize their firms are overvalued. Several
scholars have asserted that cash-financed deals are more beneficial to bidding firms’
shareholders (Carow, Heron, & Saxton, 2004; Huang & Walkling, 1987; Loughran &
Vijh, 1997; Travlos, 1987). However, Heron and Lie (2002) suggested there were no
significant differences in operating performance between cash and stock deals but
showed lower postacquisition market returns for stock acquisitions than for cash
acquisitions. Interestingly, Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2006) asserted that acquirer
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abnormal announcement returns are higher for private firms than for public target firms.
Although the types of deals in the restaurant industry have rarely been studied, some
financial scholars suggested that managers of low book-to-market firms might make
poorer acquisition decisions than managers of other firms. These suggestions imply that
acquiring firms in the restaurant industry should consider that prior performance
influences acquisition returns.
Researchers investigating the cost of acquisitions have emphasized that the
influence of different cultures and political characteristics (Pablo, 1994). An emergent
and growing field of inquiry is the cultural dynamics of M&As and the implications of
cultural differences for the postmerger integration process (Cartwright & Schoenberg,
2006). Some scholars have sought to explain underperformance in terms of the effect that
variables such as cultural distance (Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998), cultural fit (Weber,
Shenkar, & Raveh, 1996), different management style (Datta, 1991; Larsson &
Finkelstein, 1999), cultural change (Kavanagh & Ashkanasy, 2006), and cultural
convergence (Birkinshaw, Bresman, & Hakanson, 2000) have on the integration process
of firms engaging in M&A activity. These scholars suggested that strategic culture
integration is very important between acquirers and targets to enhance synergyinfluenced long-term postacquisition accounting returns.
Many scholars have also asserted that historical operating performance has a role in
acquisition events. For instance, Heron and Lie (2002) suggested that postacquisition
performance increased when bidders with higher market-to-book ratios acquired targets
with low market-to-book ratios. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) suggested that high
Tobin’s Q bidders attained more than low Tobin’s Q bidders and low Tobin’s Q targets
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benefited more from takeovers than high Tobin’s Q targets. The researchers also found
that bidder announcement returns were negatively associated with cash flow for low
Tobin’s Q bidders rather than related to cash flow for high Tobin’s Q bidders.
Interestingly, this finding implies that acquisition performance increases when a highperforming firm pairs with low-performing targets. Chatterjee (1992) suggested lowperforming targets provide upside restructuring value, which offers the greatest
opportunity for value creation in takeovers. Researchers have also asserted that firm size
influences the performance of acquisitions. Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) found that
large mergers resulted in positive postacquisition accounting performance and increased
customer satisfaction, employee productivity, and asset growth (Cornett & Tehranian,
1992).
In contrast, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) found that small
acquisitions by small bidders showed positive announcement gains, whereas large
acquisitions by large bidders showed negative announcement losses. These studies
indicated that large firms contributed larger acquisition premiums than smaller firms and
suggested that large firms’ acquisition decisions played a more important role than small
firms’ decisions. Thus, the role of firm size in the restaurant industry is an important cost
factor in acquisition performance.
Some scholars have observed that acquirers earned negative returns while other
scholars have asserted bidders gained positive returns for M&As. Jensen and Ruback
(1983) reported an average abnormal return of –5.5% during the 12 months after
takeovers. Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988) used a comprehensive sample of U.S. and
U.K. acquirers from 1955 to 1985. The researchers found that after merging firms
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reported negative abnormal returns. Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991) used an equally
weighted index. The results generated with multiple factor benchmarks and the eightportfolio benchmark in particular showed no significant abnormal returns. These findings
confirmed findings from earlier studies (Asquith, Bruner, & Mullins, 1987; Dodd, 1980;
Langetieg, 1978; Morck et al., 1990). However, scholars have asserted that the acquiring
firms’ shareholders gained normal returns over the 5-year period following takeovers.
Additionally, Magenheim and Mueller (1988) and Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker
(1992) found that shareholders lost on average. The authors concluded managers sought
to maximize firm size rather than shareholder wealth. Bradley et al. (1988) found that
excess returns to acquirers after a takeover was announced decreased from about 4% in
the 1960s to 1.3% in the 1970s and then to –3% in the 1980s. However, the scholars also
suggested positive combined earnings for acquirers with public targets in takeovers for
each period. Further, Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) and Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988)
suggested that multiple acquirers for a target were associated with significantly higher
abnormal returns.
Overall, although many scholars have explored whether acquisitions contributed to
firms’ positive performance, product market, or capability domains, some scholars also
found that due to the costs or risks of acquisitions that firms need to consider the
framework of the firm’s strategic direction, the similarity of their organizational cultures,
top management styles, and decision-making practices.
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2.3

Gains from Acquisitions

Acquisitions and mergers are still popular strategies. Since 1960, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has recorded more than 20,000 acquisitions and mergers.
Acquisitions are generally good news for the stockholders of the acquiring firms.
Benefits include economies of scale, attribution of monopoly or economic power,
diversification, and increase in the stocks’ market ability (Butters, Lintner, & Cary, 1951;
Edwards, 1955; Levy & Sarnat, 1970; Lewellen, 1971; Lintner, 1971).
Global investment in mergers and acquisitions (hereafter referred to simply as
acquisitions) has reached unprecedented levels in recent years (Barkema & Schijven,
2008). Acquisition activity in terms of monetary and strategic issues has increasingly
become a focus of study in several academic fields. Although this interest has generated
considerable knowledge related to acquisitions, the range of findings from these
comprehensive areas lacks theoretical integration, which constrains scholars’ ability to
synthesize the remarkable contributions by each discipline. Acquisitions are a crucial
activity for redirecting and renewing corporate strategy. Many researchers and
practitioners have studied the executive as a rational decision maker, and investigated an
efficient marketplace for a strategically advantageous acquisition.
Given that, why do firms undertake acquisitions? Although many scholars have
argued there are many reasons for acquisitions, three criteria, including market power,
efficiency, and economies of scale, are examined here. First, market power is an attempt
to appropriate more value from consumers. Although an early study did not find evidence
of market power as an acquisition antecedent (Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 1983), some
researchers have found the effect through increasing stock prices and highly diversified
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firms. In general, mergers due to strategic management may improve the performance of
the acquiring firm in an industrial organization. Mergers can be identified from the
contingency framework for diversification strategies as described in strategic
management studies (Christensen, Berg, & Salter, 1976; Rumelt, 1974) because mergers
show diversification activity. An acquiring firm merges to achieve competitive strengths
and improve the growth rate of the firm’s markets with the acquired firm. In addition, the
more similar the environments of the two firms, the greater the performance profit for the
acquired firm. The FTC classifies mergers as horizontal, vertical, product, or market
concentric, or conglomerate, which indicates the amount of strategic fit achieved in a
merger.
Second, acquisitions are motivated by the desire to increase efficiency. Efficiency
that reduces the cost of creating value results from improvements in long-term plant
productivity (McGuckin & Nguyen, 1995) and public accounting service delivery
(Banker, Chang, & Cunningham, 2003). Management scholars have shown managerial
interest in an acquisition. Acquisitions increase managerial value since managers attempt
to maximize their own interest.
Third, Capron, Dussauge, and Mitchell (1998) suggested that managers view
acquisitions as a means of promoting redeployment of assets and competence transfers to
generate economies of scope. King, Slotegraaf, and Kesner (2008) showed that acquirer
abnormal returns were associated with the degree of the acquirer and target firm resource
complementarity. Redeploying resources enables acquirers to add to existing strengths
and extend resources into new parts, and it contributes to economies of scale.
Additionally, managers may use acquisitions as a means of innovation with their
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resources. The market position and resources of firms involved in acquisitions affect
future product market performance (Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, & Cotterill, 2001). The
empirical results show that synergy is the primary motive in takeovers with a positive
relationship between the target and total gains. Thus, M&As do pay.

2.4

Diversification

Researchers have investigated the effect of unrelated diversification and related
diversification. Firm diversification has been a widely accepted strategy in U.S. industry.
In the current study, acquisitions are associated with unrelated and related diversification
because restaurant firms diversify resources to enter sectors different from the firms’ own
within the restaurant industry.
Ansoff (1957) first used the term “diversification” to demonstrate corporate growth
strategies involving entering new markets with a new product. Berry (1971) indicated
diversification was an increase in the number of industries in which a business
participates. Dundas and Richardson (1980) argued that when firms diversify, they
differentiate markets and pursue more than one target market. This is one of the most
frequently used definitions of diversification.
According to Amit and Livnat (1988), diversifying business combinations helps
increase the size of the business, accomplishes an economy of scale in manufacturing,
marketing, and research and development (R&D), and thus produces synergic effects for
an overall operation. Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) contended that through
diversification companies seek to utilize excessive resources of current performances for
extra earnings. Montgomery (1994) illustrates three main theoretical perspectives that can
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be used to explain why a firm might choose to diversify: agency theory, the resourcebased view, and market power.
From the agency cost theory, managers may seek to diversify because it is
expected to (1) expand their compensation (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), power, and prestige
(Jensen, 1986); (2) make their positions with the firm more secure or less volatile by
making investments that require their particular skills via manager-specific investments
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1991); or (3) reduce the risk of their personal investment portfolio by
reducing firm risk since the managers cannot reduce their own risk by diversifying their
portfolios (Amihud & Lev, 1981).
In the resource-based view, rent-seeking firms diversify in response to excess
capacity in resources such as productive factors. According to Penrose (1959), a
diversified firm is an efficient form for organizing economic activities. For instance, the
firm may use the same marketing and distribution channel to market a variety of goods or
services. Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) noted that a firm’s resources differ in in
terms of specificity. For example, more specific resources, such as productive skills in
biotechnology, may be efficiently applied in only a small number of industries but may
yield higher marginal returns because of their specificity unlike less specific factors such
as standard-issue machines. In other words, for a firm with less specific resources, profits
may be maximized at a relatively high level of diversification even though a firm with
more specific resources could obtain higher profits with less diversification.
From the market power perspectives, this perspective argues that the large
diversified firm in terms of conglomerate power is market power. A firm may be able to
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exploit, extend, or defend its power by tactics other than those that are traditionally
associated with the view of monopoly.
Villalonga (2000) offered three anticompetitive motives for diversification. First,
one industry uses the profits generated with predatory pricing policy in another industry.
The second stimulus involves colluding with other firms that compete with the firm in the
market. Finally, firms may use corporate diversification to participate in reciprocal
buying with other large firms to drive out smaller competitions. Additionally, Rumelt
(1974) claimed that diversification could be understood as an aggregation of two or more
income streams.
However, Datta, Rajagopalan, and Rasheed (1991) argued that previous
researchers overlooked industry structure (e.g., industry competition, concentration,
growth rate, and profitability). This means that the performance of diversification
strategies depends on the performance of the target industry.

2.5

Unrelated Diversification

Several scholars have suggested that unrelated diversified firms performed better
than related firms (Luffuman & Reed, 1984; Michel & Shaked, 1984). Because the
earnings streams from related diversification are significantly correlated based on
business segment diversification (e.g., earlier-than-expected technological obsolescence
of a similar production technology), it is unlikely that risk will be largely reduced. In
addition, unrelated diversification could be more profitable than related diversification
because unrelated diversified firms are in a better position to reduce the cost of capital
and optimally invest (Hill & Snell, 1988).
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Going further, unrelated strategies might present some unique advantages of their
own derived primarily from financial synergies. For example, portfolio theory suggests
that industry-specific risk can be reduced only through extraindustry diversification
(Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1989). Therefore, unrelated diversification can do more to
reduce risk since this strategy involves business units in multiple industries (Amit &
Livnat, 1988). Though some scholars (Lubatkin & Rogers, 1989) would take issue with
this position by arguing that related firms enjoy reduced risk owing to their superior
competitive advantage, on balance, most still believe risk reduction is a greater advantage
for unrelated diversifiers (Barney, 1997).
Furthermore, the lower risk that results from portfolio effects and reduced
probabilities of bankruptcy can also lead to increased debt capacity (Seth, 1990). These
firms may also enjoy the windfall of reduced taxes, even in the absence of operational
synergies because interest expenses are tax deductible. As a result, lower operating risk is
associated with more stable cash flows and increased levels of leverage (Amit & Livnat,
1988).
Recent conceptual developments in strategy have focused on diversification using
a resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Foss, 1998; Wernerfelt, 1984). This
method views the firms as a bundle of heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile resources
(Wade & Gravill, 2003). Mobility is defined as resources that “can be bought and sold in
factor markets” (Barney, 1991). Under this condition, the resources enable the firm to
obtain sustained competitive advantage. The resource-based view of diversified
corporations ultimately lies in sharing strategic assets and capabilities among entities
(Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Teece, 1982) rather than simply reducing transactions costs.
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In terms of the resource-based view, resources are more easily shared in related
diversification than in unrelated diversification (Capron & Hulland, 1999). Efficiently
shared resources mean firms are expected to perform better than the sum of the separate
resources in the business (Coase, 1937; Robins, 1992; Teece, 1984).
The type of diversification that might result from a resource depends on its
specificity in a particular industry (Gorecki, 1975; Grabowski & McGuckin, 1985;
Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988). If a resource can be used to produce only one product,
then the resource is not suitable for diversification. However, most resources can be used
for more than one end product (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). According to the
substantial tradition in the literature (Macdonald, 1984; Montgomery & Hariharn, 1990;
Teece, 1982), to make related or unrelated diversification work, three classes of resources
are required: (a) physical resources, (b) intangible assets, and (c) financial resources.
A firm’s physical resources, such as a plant and equipment, are characterized as
fixed capacity. They are generally useful in similar industries. If excess physical capacity
motivates diversification, industries closely related to those in which the capacity is being
used would be included (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). Barton (1998) and Bettis (1981)
suggested that capital expenditures were associated with related diversification.
Intangible assets include brands and human skills. A brand name can be applied to
several products with little or no adverse effects on existing applications. Similarly, a
strong marketing team could successfully market in different markets without risk to the
brand of the original business. A motivation for intangible assets is to present a
developed approach that captures the skill base of relatedness (Farjoun, 1994), in
particular, human skills shared by researchers interested in the resource-based view
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(Barney, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982; Wernerfelt,
1984), and by practitioners who view these resources as essential to firm success (Hall,
1992).
In general, financial resources are the most flexible of all resources because the
resources can be used to buy all other types of productive resources. Financial resources
can be classified as internal funds and external funds (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991).
Internal funds consists of liquidity at hand and unused debt capacity to borrow at normal
rates. External funds consist of new equity and possibly high-risk debts. Several
researchers found that lower levels of internal funds lead to lower levels of unrelated
diversification and vice versa (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). Since unrelated
diversification tends to be considered risky by the capital market (Barton, 1988; Lubatkin
& O’Neill, 1987; Montgomery & Singh, 1984), external funds would not generally be
available for unrelated diversification.
The general belief is that physical resources and intangible resources are
associated with related diversification, while financial resources are associated with
unrelated diversification (Coase, 1937; Teece, 1982). Empirical evidence finds
organizations diversify more broadly than predicted by Penrose (1959) and other modern
resource-based approaches (Teece at al., 1997). Various researchers recognized an
organization’s heterogeneous resources are key to explaining the behavior and
performance of large diversified firms (Montgomery, 1994; Montgomery & Hariharan,
1991; Teece, 1982), and thus, a conceptual model that integrates Penrose’s (1959)
resource-based approach with an incomplete market approach (Denrell, Fang, & Winter,
2003) was proposed. However, since Penrose’s (1959) resource-based logic is limited in
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explaining unrelated diversification, this conceptual model also draws on dynamic
capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) and absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal,
1990).
Dynamic capabilities emphasize that changes to an organization’s resources can
lead to increasingly unrelated diversification (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat &
Raubitschek, 2001; Miller, 2003). Moreover, since unrelated diversification broadens an
organization’s knowledge base (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Hales, 1999; Miller, 2003), a
diverse knowledge base can increase an organization’s “absorptive capacity” to
assimilate a broader range of market opportunities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane,
Koka, & Pathak, 2006; Nicholls, Nixon, & Woo, 2003). As new information is
assimilated, it promotes new learning, which can increase an organization’s absorptive
capacity to further diversify into unrelated markets or industries (Bowman & Hurry,
1993; Lane et al., 2006). Thus, physical resources and intangible resources (brands,
human skills) can be beneficial for unrelated diversification.

2.6

Related Diversification

Researchers have investigated diversification and firm performance for almost 40
years. Scholars have examined the relationship between diversification and firm
performance depending on accounting-based performance and market-based
performance. Ramanujam (1987) suggested that related firms outperform unrelated firms,
using Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) count categorical classification. The
entropy measure of diversification has been used by strategy researchers in response to
the need for an objective measure that addresses strategic differences.
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Rumelts (1974, 1982) indicated that related diversification produces greater profits
than unrelated diversification. In addition, related and unrelated diversification reduces
profit volatility. Higgins and Schall (1975), Lewellen (1971), and Schere (1980)
suggested that diversified firms can allocate their capital resources more efficiently than
undiversified firms by optimally using internal capital. Martin and Sayrk (2003)
illustrated that diversification can also mitigate failure in new markets through crosssubsidization regarding the decrease in financial risk.
Some empirical studies have asserted that related diversification increases profits
more than unrelated diversification (Barton, 1988; Bettis, 1981; Bettis & Hall, 1982;
Lecraw, 1984; Lubatkin & Rogers, 1989; Montgomery & Singh, 1984; Palepu, 1985).
Bettis (1981) found that related diversification outperforms unrelated diversification by
approximately one to three points of return on assets. Palepu (1985) suggested that
profitability growth is significantly larger with related diversification than unrelated
diversification. Lubatkin and Rogers (1989) found that related diversification tends to
create better market returns than unrelated market diversification.
Generally, related diversification happens when a parent and its subsidiary
operate in congruent areas, while unrelated diversification occurs when a parent and its
subsidiary operate in dissimilar areas. A restaurant that acquires another restaurant is an
example of diversification because the investment is made in firms in various restaurant
sectors.
Although advocators of related diversification contended related diversification is
better than unrelated diversification in terms of profitability, defenders of unrelated
diversification asserted that unrelated diversification had various investment
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opportunities (Scharfstein & Stein, 2000). Thus, unrelated diversification can increase
profits more than related diversification because of the decreased cost of capital and
investment in a better position (Hill & Snell, 1988).
In particular, some researchers found no evidence that related diversification
provided more advantages than unrelated diversification (Bass, Cattin, & Wittink, 1978;
Chatterjee, 1986; Grinyer & Yasai-Ardekani, 1980; Ravenscraft, 1983). Consequently,
the profitable advantage of related diversification is conflicting in terms of its rationale
and in empirical studies in terms of resource-based views.

2.7

Tangible and Intangible Resources between Restaurant Segments

An important notion that appears consistently in the resource-based view is
heterogeneity in firm resources. These resources may be tangible or intangible and can be
classified as physical and human. Homogeneous versus heterogeneous resource
distribution has been discussed explicitly by previous researchers who compared the
market model of competitive advantage (Porter, 1980) and the resource-based view of the
firm (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).
Tse and Olsen (1988) found that most executives in the limited-service restaurant
segment perceived their strategies as primarily low-cost producers. In contrast, most
executives in the full-service restaurant segment viewed their strategies as primary
differentiation (Harrington, 2011). This suggested more reliance on heterogeneous
resources for firms in the full-service restaurant segment. The National Restaurant
Association suggested that the limited-service restaurants had relatively higher
homogeneous resources for two reasons.
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First, marketing costs as a percentage of total sales are consistently higher for
limited-services restaurants than for full-service restaurants. This indicates national
branding (intangible resource) or marketing efforts that imply more of a focus on the
industry as a level of analysis and external differentiation is characteristic of the market
model of competition, which assumes homogeneous resources (Peteraf, 1993).
Second, limited-service restaurants appear to lend themselves more readily to
standardization, which suggests more operating facilities (tangible resources). In addition,
the higher employee turnover rate and nonhuman skills (intangible resources) in the
limited-service restaurants suggest that any unique abilities will be more quickly
dispersed to other firms in the segment (Decarolis & Deeds, 1999). Thus, full-service and
limited-service restaurants are different sectors or segments in terms of the resourcebased view such as tangible and intangible resources.

2.8

Financial Resources between Restaurant Segments

The restaurant industry is particularly vulnerable during times of economic distress
(Gu, 1993). In general, this industry has lower profit margins than other industries,
averaging between 2% and 6% (Skidelsky, 2009), further aggravating the effect a
recession has on the industry. Full-service and limited-service restaurants tend to react
differently to the recession effect in terms of financial resources.
Full-service restaurants generally rely on high profit margins because sales are
mainly derived from customers’ discretionary spending. When a recession occurs,
customer sentiment and household income are lower, and full-service restaurants are the
first to feel the effects (Youn & Gu, 2010). However, fast-food restaurants depend on
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large sales volume to compensate for lower profit margins. Sales are primarily necessity
expenditures. Limited-service restaurants have steadier revenues (Youn & Gu, 2010)
while the liquidity and profitability ratios have generally improved in the postrecession
period for full-service restaurants in restaurant sectors. That may mean that when
restaurant firms operate in two sectors, the profits may increase more or better than when
the parent restaurant firms operate in only the same sector.
Further, Gu (1996) suggested that full-service restaurants had a lower current acid
test and operating cash flow to current liability ratios. In comparison, limited-service
restaurants had a higher current and acid test ratio and cash flow coverage for current
liabilities. Lower liquidity may partly be attributed to full-service restaurants’ increased
interests because of increased long-term debt financing. Therefore, full-service and
limited-service restaurants can be divided into different segments because the different
segments have unique financial features in terms of financial resources.

2.9

Types of Acquisition under Study

In this study, the types of acquisitions include same-sector and different-sector
acquisitions. When a full-service restaurant acquires a full-service restaurant or a limitedservice restaurant acquires a limited-service restaurant, the acquisition is a same-sector
acquisition. When a full-service restaurant acquires a limited-service restaurant or
limited-service restaurant acquires a full-service restaurant, the acquisition is a differentsector acquisition.
Researchers have used three approaches to measure the difference between related
diversification and unrelated diversification: (a) categorical measures, (b) SIC measures,
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and (c) resource-based views (Davis & Duhaime, 1992). Categorical measures are built
on typological work (Wrigley, 1970) and typically involve classification of a firm in
terms of one of several characteristic types of diversification. SICs are the most
commonly used determinants in the literature. The resource-based view has been used in
situations in which categories are hard to apply or where SIC data are not available, such
as when diversification occurs within firm boundaries. Unlike traditional SIC measures,
the new concept of relatedness views each industry or line of business as a combination
of resources (Farjoun, 1998).
In addition, many scholars have noted the shortcomings of using exclusively SICbased measures to determine the extent of diversification activities (Wade & Gravill,
2003). In other words, the SIC code was considered along with a measure of
diversification experience to determine whether a parent and a subsidiary were related.
Consideration of only the parent’s SIC code might underestimate the extent of the parent
firm’s experience in the industry. For example, a parent may operate in one industry, but
investment may extensively occur in another sector of the industry. Thus, areas in which
the parent firm has experience in another sector of one industry should be measured in
terms of the resource-based view. Consequently, diversification within one industry must
be determined by relatedness in the sectors or groups in terms of the resources-based
view rather than by similarity in the physical attributes of products in the same industry
(i.e., the four-digit SIC code).
For instance, the restaurant industry uses 5812 (eating places), and restaurants can
be classified as full-service and limited-service restaurants in terms of the North
American Industry Classification (NAICS). The NAICS is the standard used by federal
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statistical agencies to classify business establishments to collect, analyze, and publish
statistical data related to the U.S. business economy. The NAICS was developed under
the auspices of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and adapted in 1997 to
replace the SIC system. In this study, the relevant sectors and the NAICS-based measures
correspond empirically.
Full-service and limited-service restaurants make same-sector (i.e., full-service to
full-service or limited-service to limited-service) and different-sector (i.e., full-service to
limited-service or limited-service to full-service) acquisitions because of similar market
profiles and resource endowments. Thus, the main purpose of the experiment in this
study is to examine how the financial performance of the acquiring firm is affected and
how the operating performance of the acquiring firm is influenced depending on a
resource-based view when a segment is extended via acquisition. Consequently, in this
study, the terms different-sector acquisitions and same-sector acquisitions are used.

2.10 Hypotheses
This study addresses a significant knowledge gap by focusing on marketing,
financial strategy, and operating perspectives for sectors through the type of acquisition
on the effects of particular theoretical importance and managerial interest. Thus, all else
being equal, when a firm has a strong management strategy, the firm can generate profits
and improve performance due to acquisitions. From this perspective, based on the
literature review, in this section hypotheses are proposed.
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2.10.1 Performance through Acquisition
Although a few studies investigated the effects of acquisition on restaurant
performance, most examined only short-term and long-term abnormal returns by studying
M&As. Previous M&A studies of the restaurant industry showed different results
regarding whether acquiring firms had positive or negative or not significant abnormal
returns in the stock market after acquisitions (Andrew, 1988; Enz, Canina & Walsh,
2001; Hsu & Jang, 2007; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Kwansa, 1994; Sheel & Nagpal,
2000). However, stock returns may not correlated with a firm’s accounting performance
because changes in the market valuation around the time of the takeover would not reflect
the restaurant firms’ accounting performance.
In the hospitality literature, Hsu and Jang (2007) suggested that hotel firms’
mergers had a negative effect on ROA and ROE, but the study may not fully explain
firms’ profitability. The authors compared the means of the ROA and the ROE of 1, 2,
and 3 years before the merger and 1, 2, and 3 years after the merger, but the effect of the
M&A could occur after the merger. Thus, a firm’s performance each year after the
merger may need to be compared with 1 year before the merger.
Although no empirical study has investigated the long-term accounting
performances of acquiring restaurant firms, theoretical arguments on the benefits of
acquisition suggested firms can lead to increased acquisition performance through market
power, efficiency, and economies of scale (Butters, Lintner, & Cary, 1951; Dussauge &
Mitchell, 1988; Edwards, 1955; Levy & Sarnat, 1970; Lewellen, 1971; Lintner, 1971;
McGuckin & Nguyen, 1995;). Similarly, through acquisitions, the restaurants’
performance can increase according to the three perspectives.
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First, in terms of market power, restaurants can generate company-operated firms
and more franchises or increase market share to control food price and production.
Further, firms can increase sales growth and firm size through increased equipment and
plants that contribute to productivity and reduce costs.
Second, in terms of efficiency, restaurant firms might have a low tolerance for
risk and for the potential losses that could be incurred from investing in failed food
products and quickly acquire food product skills. In addition, restaurants could make
more effective strategic decisions to assemble a portfolio of complementary brands and
products because different investment options can provide balance and diversify risk in a
securities portfolio.
Third, in terms of economies of scale, restaurant firms can be managed such that
there are low barriers to entry and there are a large number of entrepreneurs.
Additionally, the firms can broaden their geographical range effectively by adding
multiple stores and brands.
However, some empirical studies found acquisitions had a negative effect on firm
performance. For example, Singh (1971) suggested two thirds of the surviving companies
reported lower profits in the year of the merger and three quarters had lower profitability
in the third postmerger year. Dickerson et al. (1997) and Utton (1974) also asserted that
postacquisition profitability deteriorated. Utton compared the profitability of a sample of
merger-intensive firms with a random sample of firms that grew primarily through
internal expansion and argued that average profitability measured by the pretax rate of
the return on net book assets was significantly lower for the merging firms than for the
control firms.
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In addition to firm performance, the link between acquisition and executive
compensation was widely investigated in previous studies (Barle & Means, 1932;
Baumol, 1959; Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Elston & Goldberg, 2003; Finkelstein
& Hambrick, 1989; Mangel & Singh, 1993; McKnight, 1996; Mueller, 1969; Williamson,
1975). Executive compensation is one reason that firms make acquisitions. Large public
firms need to hire high-quality executives, and they induce higher payments or bonuses
for themselves (Agarwal, 1981; Core et al., 1999; Riahi-Belkaoui, 1992). In particular,
Kroll, Simons, and Wright (1990) asserted that an increase in firm size achieved through
M&As led to significant increases in CEO compensation for owner- and managercontrolled firms. Thus, restaurant firms’ acquisitions could be also related to managerial
compensation.
In addition, scholars have often argued but researched less often that cultural
differences can be a source of confusion, hostility, and distrust between the members of
the merging organization (Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Krug & Nigh, 2001; Olie, 1990)
and a major contributor to the high failure rates reported in the M&A literature (Datta,
Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). Restaurant firms that
acquire other firms may find it hard to increase their performance due to cultural
differences such as different cultural distance, management style, and cultural fit between
acquirers and targets (Chartfield, Dalbor, & Ramdeen, 2011).
In general, most restaurants are small businesses. Seventy percent have fewer than
20 employees, and more than 70% of restaurants are single-unit (independent) operations
(Chatfield et al., 2011). In recent years, the restaurant industry has experienced
tremendous competition (Gu, 2002), and many restaurants failed due to rapid expansion
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through M&As (Schwartz, 1999). Gu (2002) suggested that the restaurant industry had
more business failures than any other industry that saw numerous M&As.
In terms of the theoretical advantages of M&A, the market power of restaurant
firms may be limited because food is not a high-technology product whose prices can be
controlled in the market. The price of food, depending on the menu, is generally
consistent in the restaurant industry. Further, the efficiency of restaurant firms can be
lower than other industries such as manufacturing and technology firms. Restaurants
cannot effectively use or save food inventory for a long time because food is perishable.
Of course, this study does not claim that market power, efficiency, economies of scale,
compensation, and cultural differences are not necessary casual factors that contribute to
the success and failure of restaurant acquisitions. Numerous variables have been
proposed that influence the accounting performance of restaurant firms that engage in
acquisition activity. Nevertheless, the theoretical benefits of M&As are weaker for
restaurant firms compared to other industries because of the food and service industry.
Consequently, the following was hypothesized:

H1: Acquisitions have negative effects on restaurants’ performance over the long term.

2.10.2 Different-Sector Acquisition vs. Same-Sector Acquisition
Although a range of costs may increase during acquisitions, the data suggest that,
in general, acquisitions are meant to maximize a firm’s value (Salter & Weinhold, 1979).
The dominant theory related to how this value can be created suggests that firms acquire
other firms with related resource-based views, thus creating efficiency through synergy.
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Synergy may imply that gains accrue to the acquiring firm through three sources: (a)
improved operating efficiency, and plant, property, and equipment (PPE) based on
physical resources; (b) some type of assets of brand and human skill transfer based on
intangible assets; and (c) revenue, liquidity, and leverage based on financial resources.
Some scholars have suggested that synergistic efficiencies generate market power over
competitors (Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1983; Eckbo, 1983; Montgomery, 1985; Stewart,
Harris, & Carleton, 1984).
Traditional diversification scholars have argued that similarities among acquiring
and target firms’ resources should lead to higher performance. Although a few hospitality
scholars have suggested acquisitions had negative effects on firm performance, resourcebased view theory led to the conclusion that complementarity could be more important
(Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001). For example, full-service and limitedservice restaurants have advantages and disadvantages with different resource features in
terms of the resource-based view. Each restaurant sector’s unique resources can be
realized by integrating complementary resources through acquisitions. Complementing
resources by different-sector acquisitions could provide more opportunity for the
restaurants to create competitive advantages that could be sustained for a longer period of
time than same-sector acquisitions because different-sector acquisitions could strengthen
their advantageous resources and make up for their weak resources by complementing
resources through acquisitions. Thus, the effects of acquisition on restaurant firms’
performance could be different depending on how each sector’s resources is combined.
Of course, same-sector acquisitions with highly similar resources may be able to
achieve greater market power and to promote redeployment of assets. However, same-
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sector acquisitions may not be able to develop other valuable potential synergies as a
result of their integration because of the limitation of using various resources. In contrast,
integrating different yet complementary resources between different-sector acquisitions
may present more opportunities for synergy derived from tangible, intangible, and
financial resources.
Barney’s (1988) proposition that synergy may be a necessary but not in sufficient
condition to gain value for the acquiring firm may offer insight if a related acquisition or
an unrelated acquisition produces more value. Barney (1988) suggested that value is
created for the acquiring firm when private and uniquely valuable cash flows exist
between the acquiring and target firms. Unique resources exist when an acquiring
restaurant firm will benefit more than another acquiring firm from the synergy created
through acquisition. Harrison et al. (2001) investigated combining resources through
acquisitions, using a sample of approximately 400 acquisitions, to assess resource
similarity versus complementarity. The authors suggested that resource complementarity
creates the potential for greater synergy from acquisitions, leading to higher long-term
firm performance as an end result.
In addition, a resource-based perspective of firm strategy (Wernerfelt, 1984)
suggested that merged firms with high similarity and relatively different resource
integration in critical areas could be expected to enjoy great performance improvements
compared to merged firms with widely disparate resource distributions. Acquisitions of
target firms with operating and corporate strategic resources for the acquiring firm are
expected to produce significant synergies because the financial performance improves.
However, aspects of synergy (physical resources, brand names, human skills, and funds)
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may imply an appropriate combination of tangible, intangible, and financial resources
with different resources between acquiring and target restaurants as the source of
knowledge for value creation. Different resources could be more positively associated
with resource complementarity in the different-sector acquisitions.
Thus, resource complementarity provides a rich base for the study of synergy
between acquiring and target restaurants and the associated performance outcomes that
result from acquisitions. The approach for the resource-based view of the firm could be
more complementary than the traditional division between related and unrelated
diversification because this study focuses on specific resource perspectives.
In the global economy, the most successful combined firms rely on
complementary resources with different resources as the foundation needed to exploit
entrepreneurial opportunities (Ireland, Hitt, Camp, & Sexton, 2001). This can be applied
to restaurant firms because different resources combined can suggest stronger synergies
for the development, cost savings, use of equipment, and financial structure.
Additionally, different resources for full-service restaurants and limited-service
restaurants in terms of capital investments likely result in relatively high degrees of
variance in the types of capital equipment used and the types of skills that employees
possess. Full-service restaurants may acquire limited-service restaurants to extend
economic scope, save labor costs, and use more debt financing. Such synergy may help
the acquiring firm respond more quickly to competitors’ economic scale. Integrating two
sets of different but complementary resources and capabilities allows firms to develop
and take advantage of new opportunities (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001).
Consequently, if the expertise combines the benefits of resources, the firms could
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participate in all types of restaurant sectors because the restaurants could be more
effectively managed for financial fluctuations and operating systems.
However, same-sector acquisitions can be risky or less profitable than differentsector acquisitions because the restaurants cannot be more effectively managed with
similar resources for financial fluctuation, recession, and food flexibility. Same-sector
acquisitions do not necessarily imply a lack of synergy, especially if the synergy is
considered private. Barney (1988) asserted that above-normal returns can be generated
for the acquiring firm in combination with the target firm if the synergistic relationship is
unique for other acquiring firms. An acquiring firm with private synergy based on similar
resource patterns is likely to have an advantage because other potential acquirers may not
recognize or have the private synergy involved and, therefore, will not enter the auction.
If differences are involved and the synergy is private, the degree of similar resources may
not be immaterial between the sectors in the restaurant industry: However, private
synergy is unusual in the restaurant industry because food and service firms rather than
manufacturing or IT firms are involved. Thus, synergy from these similarities may be
difficult for other acquirers to optimize and use; thus, they may offer fewer competitive
advantages and more limited access in same-sector acquisitions in the restaurant industry.
In contrast, Hitt and Ireland (1986, 1985) found that firms may develop multiple
distinctive competencies. Because of the combined competencies, merging two firms
may create value that overcomes and controls weakness in one or both acquisition
partners. In terms of the resource-based view, restaurants may acquire targets to be more
attractive in different markets as well as efficient in the products and distribution of the
different resources in the sectors. Consequently, different-sector acquisitions can

40
effectively integrate and manage resources in order to use the combined benefits while
same-sector acquisitions cannot adequately cope in the market. Thus, the relationship
between different-sector and same-sector acquisitions was hypothesized.

H2: Different-sector acquisitions are better than same-sector acquisitions for restaurant
performance.
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.
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

3.1

Long-Term Accounting Performance

Most researchers investigating mergers and acquisitions have taken a short-term
view of the topic. Various measures have been used to evaluate the success of
acquisitions. These include subjective evaluation (Kitching, 1967; Power, 1982), capital
asset pricing measures (Elgers & Clark, 1980), and profitability measures (Dickerson,
Gibson, & Tsakalotes, 1997; Kusewitt, 1985; Poindexter, 1970).

3.1.1

Accounting Performance Measure: ROA and ROE

Measures for average quarterly ROA and average quarterly ROE were calculated.
These measures allowed us to compare differences in the productivity of the assets and
owners’ equity. Although accounting measures have their shortcomings, ROA is one of
the more robust accounting-based measures of economic performance (Brealey & Myers,
1984). ROE provides an accounting-based measure of performance that includes the
effects of financial leverage. Some studies have shown that the best strategy for
maximizing profitability is not necessarily the best for maximizing growth (Reid, 1968;
Rumelt, 1974).
First, ROA was computed by dividing net income by average total assets for each
firm. The average ROA with the quarterly data for a specific year period (e.g., 1 year
before, post 1 year, post 2 year, post 3 year, post 4 year, post 5 year) was calculated to
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calculate the average ROA growth rate change for a specific period. Each average ROA
growth rate change for a specific period was calculated by comparing the prior 1 year for
each year (e.g., prior 1 year vs. post 1 year, prior 1 year vs. post 2 year, prior 1 year vs.
post 3 year, prior 1 year vs. post 4 year, prior 1 year vs. post 5 year). An accountingbased measure cannot be used to isolate the effects of an acquisition event. Biggadike
(1979) and Lubatkin (1983) asserted that an acquisition did not affect profitability for at
least several years. Thus, the effect for a specific period such as 5 years was studied.
Second, ROE was calculated by dividing net income by average stockholder
equity for each firm. Each average ROE growth rate change was calculated with the same
method for the average ROA growth rate change calculated. The change in the average
growth rates for a specific period was calculated as the same method for the average
ROA growth rate change and the average ROE growth rate change.

3.1.2

Control Variables for Long-Term Accounting Performance

Revenue is used as a control variable instead of a measurement of size in this
study. Many general financial economics studies use total assets to proxy a firm’s size
(Lang, Stulz, & Walkling, 1991). However, since franchising through acquisitions, a
widely adopted growth strategy in the restaurant industry (Lee, Singal, & Kang, 2013), is
prevalent, total revenues that include franchise fees more appropriately reflect a
restaurant firm’s size than total assets. Therefore, revenue was included as a control
variable.
Leverage shows the debt-to-assets ratio (total debt divided by total assets) and
controls for the effect driven by a firm-specific capital structure. Higher leverage enables
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a firm to take advantage of tax shields due to the deduction of interest expense, which is
helpful for increased cash flow and a higher Tobin’s Q (McConnell & Servaes, 1990).
However, when a firm has excessive debt, the firm’s equity return may decrease due to
the perception of risk in the market (Brealey & Myers, 2003). Thus, leverage was
included as a control variable.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggested that liquidity is related to risk because high
liquidity could result in agency costs with high free cash flows. High liquidity may not be
efficiently invested for available resources, which may accumulate more risk (Borde,
1998). Additionally, Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) asserted that managers may have
an incentive to increase the level of diversification to decrease risk with high free cash
flows. In this study, liquidity was measured with the log of quick ratio (sum of cash,
marketable securities, and accounts receivable to current liabilities).
Property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) was measured as a control variable to
study investment opportunities in firms (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001) because PP&E
means that a firm is usually characterized by profitable investment opportunities and
invests in them. Thus, PP&E was likely to be related to firm performance in explaining
firms’ profitability. This variable was calculated as the log ratio of property, plants, and
equipment to total assets. For the control variables, the year the acquisition occurred was
used.

3.2

The Wilcoxon Rank Transformation

Many nonparametric methods as parametric methods applied to transformed data.
The Wilcoxon rank test was used because the observations included 30 firms. This test
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makes the results understandable and reasonable. This approach is a class of
nonparametric methods. The rank transformation approach also provides a useful method
in multiple regression, discriminant analysis, cluster analysis, analysis of experimental
designs, and multiple comparisons.
The rank transformation approach provides a useful pedagogical technique for
introducing nonparametric methods as an integral. Therefore, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test
and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test were used to identify statistically significant
differences between the full-service and limited-service restaurant sectors with z tests.

3.3

Models

To measure accounting performance, the regression model included the sum of
two variables: average ROA growth rate change and average ROE growth rate change. In
this study, the goal was to compare the two sectors. The variance of firms within
different-sector and same-sector acquisitions is controlled by introducing control
variables. As independent variables, control variables were used to use the entire sample
because the constant term indicates the effect of the acquisition by using a regression
model. In the study, dummy variables were also used for the type of restaurant
acquisition in terms of different-sector and same-sector acquisitions (e.g., different-sector
acquisitions: limited-service restaurants–full-service restaurants, or full-service
restaurants–limited-service restaurants, same-sector acquisitions: limited-service
restaurants–limited-service restaurants and full-service restaurants–full-service
restaurants). As control variables, firm revenue, firm leverage, firm liquidity, and firm
PP&E were used.
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For testing Hypothesis 1, ROA and ROE were calculated using net income as a
percentage of the average total assets and net income as a percentage of the average
common stock equity, respectively. The postacquisition performance of acquiring firms
was compared with their performance 1 year before the acquisition. The average
performance for a certain period (e.g., 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, and 5 years
postacquisition) after the acquisition was compared with the corresponding average
performance in the all firms as well as between two sectors using paired z tests. The
Wilcoxon rank test is more conservative than a t test, and it is less likely to result in
statistically significant differences between preacquisition performance and
postacquisition performance changes.
In addition, for testing Hypothesis 2, one equation measured the effect of the
acquisition using the entire sample (t = year) among the average ROA growth rate
change, the average ROE growth rate change, and the control variables based on
acquisitions in the two sectors. The constant term indicated the effect of the acquisition in
each sector. The accounting performance changes were measured with a metric with
dependent variables in the linear regression.
Additionally, for testing Hypothesis 2, equations 3.1 and 3.2 tested the effect of
acquisitions for different-sector and same-sector acquisitions to study which acquisition
was more statistically significant. A dummy represented different-sector (as a reference)
acquisitions that took 1 if there were same-sector acquisitions and took 0. A positive and
significant coefficient of the dummy variable indicates that the different-sector
acquisition was better than the same-sector acquisition. The models are as follows:
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∆ROAs t = α + 𝛽1 dummy + 𝛽2 Revenue t + 𝛽3 Leverage t + 𝛽4 Liquidity t + 𝛽5 PPE t + 𝜀 t
(3.1)

∆ROEs t = α + 𝛽1 dummy + 𝛽2 Revenue t + 𝛽3 Leverage t + 𝛽4 Liquidity t + 𝛽5 PPE t + 𝜀 t
(3.2)

Last, the effects of the acquisition on different-sector and same-sector acquisitions were
measured to study which acquisition was more statistically significant.

3.4

Data Collection Procedures

The sample for this study consisted of publicly traded U.S. restaurant firms. The
data used in this study were collected from COMPUSTAT and SDC Platinum using SIC
5812 (eating places) and then divided by the NAICS codes for limited-service restaurants
(722211 for the years before 2011 and 722513 for the years after 2011) and full-service
restaurants (722110, 722511). There were 54 public full-service restaurants and 14 public
limited-service restaurants in the United States. The data matched the COMPUSTAT
data.
On SDC Platinum, 96 firms that had acquired other firms were found. Acquiring
firms that were private firms, were not listed in the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) database, or did not present information for stock prices per acquiring firm or
duplicate firms based on ticker or not parent firms for acquirers were excluded from this
sample. Finally, the sample consisted of 30 acquiring firms. The sample covered fiscal
years 1992 to 2012. The following three steps were used to measure the firms’
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performances for the effects of acquisition. The average ROA growth rate change and the
average ROE growth rate change were investigated to measure the effect of acquisitions
on the firms’ accounting performances. In the following section, the results are discussed.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS

4.1

Sample Profile

Based on the firms’ major service features, the sample was divided into two
sectors, full-service restaurants (20 firms) and limited-service restaurants (10 firms). In
Table 4-1, details of the acquisitions are listed.
In Table 4-2, the descriptive statistics of accounting performance (ROA and ROE)
and the control variables (revenue, leverage, liquidity, and PP&E) of all companies and
then of full-service and limited-service restaurants in two sectors from an index for the
20-year period from 1992 through 2012 are summarized. Table 4-2 shows that ROA is
significantly positive for all acquiring restaurant firms in the means of the first, second,
and fifth years after acquisitions. However, there is no difference between the full-service
and limited-service restaurants. In ROE, the mean of the second year after the
acquisitions is significantly positive for all acquiring restaurant firms. In addition, the
value of the first year is higher in limited-service restaurants than in full-service
restaurants.
Revenue, leverage, liquidity, and PPE are the status in the event quarter of
acquisitions. Revenue and liquidity are higher in limited-service restaurants than in fullservice restaurants. However, PPE is higher in full-service restaurants than in limitedservice restaurants. Leverage is not significant between two sectors.
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Table 4-3 gives the results of the Wilcoxon sum tests for after the acquisitions on
firm performance. For ROA, the mean of the fifth year after the acquisitions is
significantly lower in different-sector acquisitions than in same-sector acquisitions. For
ROE, the means of the fourth and fifth years after the acquisitions is significantly lower
in different-sector acquisitions. The result for the accounting performances was almost
the same for all years. In addition, PPE was higher in the same-sector acquisitions than in
the different-sector acquisitions in terms of the status in the event quarter of acquisitions.
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Table 4.1. A List of Sample Restaurant Firms Created with Acquisitions
Full-service
restaurants (20 firms)

Acquired companies

Acquisition
announcement
date

Limited-service
restaurants (10 firms)

Acquired companies

Acquisition
announcement
date

Advantica Restaurant
Group, Inc

Perk Development Corp
(Perkins)

02/05/1999

AFC Enterprises, Inc.

Shelton Development
Company (Popeyes
Chicken & Biscuits)

05/02/2006

Benihana, Inc.

Rudy’s Restaurant Group
Ra Sushi Bar restaurant
Teppanyaki Restaurant
Haru Holding Corp.
Mimis Cafe

07/23/1997
12/04/2002
09/26/2006
03/08/2010
06/14/2004

Biglari Holdings, Inc.

Cracker Barrel Old
Country

02/17/2012

01/24/1994

Northwest Restaurant

05/05/1994

Heartland Food Corp
Restaurant
Chuck E Cheese
Restaurant
Showbiz Pizza Time
Inc.

04/30/2008
07/17/2008

On The Border Cafes Inc.

Burger King Holdings,
Inc.
CEC Entertainment,
Inc.

Maggiano’s Little Italy and
Corner Bakery

07/20/1995

NE Restaurant Co Inc.

11/20/2000

Sydran Group LLC
Vinny Testas Restaurants

09/06/2001
12/17/2001

CKE Restaurants, Inc.

12/01/1995

Avado Brands (Don
Pablos)
Schapp’s Enterprises LLC
Logans Roadhouse Inc

12/20/2007

Jack In The Box, Inc.

Summit Family
Restaurant
Qdoba Restaurant
Corp

12/21/2012
12/11/1998

McDonald Corp.

Hardees Food (Roy
Rogers Restaurant)
World Foods
Donatos Pizza

08/02/1996

Bob Evans Farms, Inc.
Brinker International,
Inc.

Buca, Inc.
Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc.
Cracker Barrel Old City,
Inc.

12/22/1998
09/09/1997

01/21/2003

02/10/1998
05/06/1999
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Table 4-1 (Cont.)
Full-service
restaurants (20 firms)
Darden Restaurants, Inc.

Acquired companies

Acquisition
announcement
date

Quality Dining Inc.
(Grady’s)
Chevy’s Rio Bravo
Restaurants
RARE Hospitality Intl
Inc.

01/16/2002

Famous Daves of
American, Inc.
Flanigans Enterprises, Inc.

North Country BBQ
Restaurant
Dannys Restaurant

Frisch’s Restaurants, Inc.
Granite City Food &
Brewery, Inc.
Landrys Restaurants, Inc.

Big Boy Restaurant
Cadillac Ranch
Restaurant
CA Muer Corp.
Chart House Restaurants
Saltgrass Steak House
Schussler Creative (TRex)
Smith & Wollensky
Triangle Foodservice
Wyatt’s
Fuddruckers Inc.
Casa Ole, Crazy Jose
Restaurant
Mission Burritos

09/27/2006
11/04/2011

Lubys, Inc.
Mexican Restaurant, Inc.

Limited-service
restaurants
(10 firms)

Acquired companies

Acquisition
announcement
date

Nathans Famous, Inc.

Miami Subs Corp
Kenny Rogers
Roasters

11/30/1998
12/23/1998

12/18/2009

Panera Bread, Inc.

Bakery Cafes

06/21/2007

08/08/1997

Papa Bello
Enterprises Inc

Mama’s Direct Inc

01/04/2012

08/01/2003
08/16/2007

02/19/2002
05/20/2002
09/11/2002
02/27/2006
01/16/2007
07/15/1996
06/18/2010
09/26/2003
08/17/2006
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Table 4-1 (Cont.)
Full-service
restaurants (20 firms)

Acquired companies

Acquisition
announcement
date

O Charleys, Inc.

Burbet Foods
Shoex Inc.
J Alexander’s Corp.
Stoney River Legendary
Ninety Nine Restaurant

11/03/1993
10/11/1995
04/06/1999
05/03/2000
10/28/2002

PF Changs Bistro, Inc.

True Food Kitchen

02/16/2012

Red Robin Gourmet, Inc.

Great Western Dining
Top Robin Ventures
Dane Country Robins Inc.
Lime Fresh Mexican Grill

03/07/2006
01/31/2007
01/31/2008
04/09/2012

K-Bob’s USA Restaurant
Pecos Diamond Steakhouse
Western Sizzlin Franchised
Restaurant
Whistle Junction Buffet
Restaurant
Holiday House Restaurant
Bar H Steakhouse
Rankin Bros Inc.

02/01/2006
07/11/2006

Ruby Tuesday, Inc.
Star Buffet, Inc.

4Bs Restaurant
JJ North’s Grand Buffet

Limited-service
restaurants
(10 firms)

Acquired companies

Acquisition
announcement
date

11/10/2006
11/28/2006
05/04/2007
06/05/2007
06/20/2007
07/31/2007
10/19/2007
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Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics of Firm Performance for the Entire Sample in the Two
Sectors (over 1992–2012)
Std Dev

Full-Service
Restaurants (a)
t value
Mean

Limited-Service
Restaurants (b)
Std Dev Mean
Std Dev

0.064

6.272***

0.044

0.051

0.070

0.091

-1.385

***

0.046

0.054

0.071

0.066

-1.376

All Companies
Mean
st

c

1 yr ROA
nd

0.051

H0:
a=b
t value

2 yr ROA

0.052

0.058

6.891

3rd yr ROA

0.019

0.127

1.143

0.005

0.138

0.064

0.072

-1.540

4th yr ROA

0.006

0.154

0.271

0.000

0.149

0.022

0.171

-0.469

5th yr ROA

0.033

0.106

2.077**

0.024

0.109

0.057

0.094

-0.900

1st yr ROEd

0.241

1.644

1.154

0.018

0.462

0.881

3.124

-1.843*

0.086

0.104

0.101

0.199

-0.369

nd

0.090

0.132

5.169

rd

-0.031

0.493

-0.477

-0.074

0.552

0.099

0.186

-1.145

th

0.373

3.058

0.871

0.548

3.578

-0.090

0.457

0.662

th

0.053

0.963

0.369

-0.075

0.889

0.404

1.109

-1.492

239.444

353.102

810.609

1156.747

-2.991***

0.217

0.143

0.244

0.176

-0.588

0.298

0.391

0.830

0.720

-3.654***

2 yr ROE
3 yr ROE
4 yr ROE
5 yr ROE
Revenue

379.894

Leverage

0.224

Liquidity

0.428

***

***

683.541

4.341

0.151

11.574***

0.538

6.218

***

PPE
0.727
0.171
33.100*** 0.776
0.109
0.577
0.235
4.490***
st
c
Note: ROA= rate of return on assets; ROE = rate of return on common stock equity. 1 yr ROA = first year
ROA after an acquisition; 1st yr ROEd = first year ROE after an acquisition.
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.3 The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Tests for Postacquisition on Firm Performance
Different-Sector Acquisitions (a) Same-Sector Acquisitions (b) H0: a=b
Mean
Std Dev
Mean
Std Dev
Z
st
c
1 yr ROA
0.034
0.090
0.057
0.051
-0.780
nd
2 yr ROA
0.044
0.074
0.055
0.052
-1.389
rd
3 yr ROA
0.034
0.082
0.015
0.138
0.190
th
4 yr ROA
0.007
0.131
0.006
0.162
-0.655
th
5 yr ROA
-0.011
0.105
0.047
0.103
-1.757*
1st yr ROEd
0.879
3.117
0.019
0.479
0.088
nd
2 yr ROE
0.108
0.116
0.084
0.136
-0.354
rd
3 yr ROE
0.094
0.131
-0.068
0.552
0.761
th
4 yr ROE
-0.020
0.207
0.494
3.497
-1.654*
th
5 yr ROE
-0.021
0.229
0.077
1.104
-1.704*
Revenue
202.804
272.040
442.860
772.296
-0.623
Leverage
0.219
0.174
0.225
0.144
-0.246
Liquidity
0.681
0.822
0.339
0.364
1.304
PPE
0.630
0.207
0.762
0.143
-2.140**
Note: ROA= rate of return on assets; ROE = rate of return on common stock equity. 1 st yr ROAc = first year
ROA after an acquisition; 1st yr ROEd = first year ROE after an acquisition.
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

4.2

Testing Hypothesis 1

In Table 4-4, the results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for postacquisition ROA
and ROE changes up to 5 years are shown; there are significant negative effects.
However, the negative effects are the strongest within a year after acquisition and
decreased until 4 years compared with the previous year. After 4 years, the negative
effects turn to positive compared to the previous year in ROA and ROE changes.
Consequently, the results demonstrate that acquiring restaurant firms’ market
performance is significantly negative on accounting performance. As a result, Hypothesis
1 was not supported.
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Table 4.4. The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests for Postacquisition Accounting
Performance Change
Panel A: ROA
1st yr post - base yr
2nd yr post - base yr
3rd yr post - base yr
4th yr post - base yr
5th yr post - base yr
Panel B: ROE
1st yr post - base yr
2nd yr post - base yr
3rd yr post - base yr
4th yr post - base yr
5th yr post - base yr

All
Acquisition
Mean
Z
-0.022 -2.409**
-0.023 -2.667***
-0.058 -3.961***
-0.083 -4.879***
-0.063 -4.442***
0.080
-0.093
-0.218
0.161
-0.171

-2.468**
-2.799***
-3.734***
-4.106***
-3.257***

Different-Sector
Acquisitions (a)
Mean
Z
-0.060 -1.710*
-0.056 -1.363
-0.066 -1.223
-0.114 -2.824***
-0.140 -2.756***

Same-Sector
Acquisitions (b)
Mean
Z
-0.009 -1.743*
-0.014 -2.218**
-0.056 -3.834***
-0.074 -3.957***
-0.038 -3.480***

H0:
a=b
Z
-0.788
-0.746
0.666
-1.299
-1.928*

0.513
-0.312
-0.325
-0.488
-0.524

-0.070
-0.030
-0.186
0.361
-0.057

-2.185**
-2.139**
-3.600***
-3.098***
-2.214**

-0.072
-0.858
0.390
-1.921*
-2.021**

-1.086
-1.992**
-1.223
-2.746***
-2.490**

Note: ROA= rate of return on assets; ROE = rate of return on common stock equity.
1st yr posta = first year ROA after an acquisition, base yrb = 1 year ROA before an acquisition; 1 st yr postc =
first year ROE after an acquisition, base yrd = 1 year ROE before an acquisition.
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

4.3

Testing Hypothesis 2

Table 4-4 shows that the results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The results
indicate that there is no significant difference in postacquiring firm performance between
same-sector and different-sector acquisitions.
Tables 4-5 and 4-6 show the regression results for the firms’ accounting
performances for acquisitions in different sectors and in the same sector. The results
show that there is no significance between different-sector and same-sector acquisitions
for all periods. However, the ROE of different-sector acquisitions is significantly positive
in only the first year. In addition, leverage had a significant negative impact on the ROA
and the ROE growth changes in all years except the fourth year. Consequently, there is
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no significance between different-sector and same-sector acquisitions. Thus, Hypothesis
2 is not supported.
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Table 4.5 Results for ROA Changes in Different-Sector and Same-Sector Acquisitions
1st year
2nd year
3rd year
4th year
5th year
a
∆ROA
∆ROA
∆ROA
∆ROA
∆ROA
Different
sectorb
-0.157
-0.078
-0.102
-0.253
-0.324
(0.098)
(0.095)
(0.136)
(0.151)
(0.138)
c
Same sector
0.028
0.017
-0.026
-0.028
0.038
(0.034)
(0.031)
(0.044)
(0.049)
(0.044)
Revenue
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
**
**
**
Leverage
-0.202
-0.236
-0.389
-0.120
-0.318*
(0.099)
(0.102)
(0.146)
(0.175)
(0.158)
Liquidity
0.021
-0.016
-0.001
-0.027
0.058
(0.037)
(0.037)
(0.053)
(0.058)
(0.050)
*
*
PP&E
0.199
0.124
0.175
0.281
0.336**
(0.114)
(0.104)
(0.149)
(0.157)
(0.156)
2
Adj. R
0.081
0.104
0.120
0.134
0.245
*
*
**
**
F value
2.050
2.300
2.500
2.510
3.790***
N
61
57
56
50
44
Note: ROA= rate of return on assets. 1 𝑠𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟∆ROA= first year ROA after an acquisition – 1 year ROA
before an acquisition. bDifferent sector stands for dummy =1 as different-sector acquisitions. cSame sector
stands for dummy = 0 as same-sector acquisitions
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.6 Results for ROE Changes in Different-Sector and Same-Sector Acquisitions
1st year
2nd year
3rd year
4th year
5th year
a
∆ROE
∆ROE
∆ROE
∆ROE
∆ROE
Different
sectorb
2.220**
-0.605
-0.574
-0.272
-1.825
(0.956)
(0.457)
(0.621)
(3.677)
(1.071)
c
Same sector
-0.365
0.165
-0.017
0.792
-0.118
(0.333)
(0.146)
(0.199)
(1.184)
(0.344)
Revenue
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
*
***
***
Leverage
1.636
-1.464
-2.186
-0.429
-2.593**
(0.965)
(0.488)
(0.667)
(4.258)
(1.223)
Liquidity
-0.442
0.023
0.061
-0.492
0.389
(0.356)
(0.179)
(0.243)
(1.413)
(0.391)
**
*
PP&E
-2.813
0.914
1.007
0.422
2.526**
(1.103)
(0.498)
(0.676)
(3.817)
(1.213)
2
Adj. R
0.127
0.222
0.197
-0.082
0.170
**
***
***
F value
2.750
4.200
3.710
0.260
2.770**
N
61
57
56
50
44
Note: ROE= rate of return on common stock equity. 1 𝑠𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟∆ROE= first year ROE after an acquisition –
1 year ROE before an acquisition. bDifferent sector stands for dummy =1 as different-sector acquisitions.
c
Same sector stands for dummy = 0 as same-sector acquisitions
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

5.1

Key Findings

In this study, the overall acquisition effects of restaurant firms were significantly
negative on the firm’s ROA and ROE. The results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for
postacquisition ROA and ROE changes up to 5 years showed significant negative effects.
However, the negative effects were strongest within a year after the acquisition occurred
and decreased until 4 years later compared with the previous year. After 4 years, the
negative effects turned positive compared to the previous year in the ROA and ROE
changes. These results indicate that acquiring firms cannot recover fully from the
negative impacts after acquisition but the negative impacts become fainter as the years go
by.
The other findings are that even though there is no significant difference in
postacquiring firm performance between same-sector and different-sector acquisitions,
the overall z scores of different-sector acquisitions from the Wilcoxon rank tests show
less negative postacquisition performance than same-sector acquisitions in ROA and
ROE changes. The ROA changes in 2 and 3 years and the ROE changes in 1 and 3 years
after acquisitions even appear nonsignificant only for the different-sector acquisitions.
The results imply that different-sector acquisitions are less negative than same-sector
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acquisitions. However, neither the results of the Wilcoxon rank tests nor regression
analysis reveal significant differences in firm performance between the two types of
acquisitions. Therefore, the effects of acquisition for different-sector and same-sector
acquisitions are negative, and there is no significant difference between them.

5.2

Theoretical Implications

The findings of this study provide a perspective on the effect of acquisitions on
firm performance. Most hospitality scholars have revealed that M&As are not beneficial
for the acquiring firms’ performance or do not, at the minimum, last short-term. This
study is in line with earlier studies that showed negative postacquisition operational
performance but differs from the previous findings in terms of year effects since the
negative effects are diminished after acquisition.
Additionally, in this study a resource-based view of restaurant segmentation was
applied as a motivation for acquiring restaurants. This attempt is still meaningful because
the relatedness of the business is a critical success factor (Canina et al., 2010) when
restaurant managers consider acquiring other firms. Most previous studies investigated
financial performance using combined restaurant firms’ data. The researchers did not
classify sectors in the same industry or identify public and private firms. Thus, this study
helps broaden understanding of restaurant firms’ postacquiring performance by
differentiating full-service and limited-service restaurants in complicated acquiring
procedures even though the results have not proposed sufficient theoretical support
regarding the effect of acquisitions in the restaurant industry.
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5.3

Managerial Implications

From a practical viewpoint, the results suggest that acquiring other firms as a
growth strategy is not appropriate for restaurant firms’ future profitability. In addition,
since the negative acquisition effects last for more than 4 years, the restaurant firms
should have enough financial capacity to overcome the deteriorated firm performance.
Therefore, managers of the acquiring firm must consider their own market position,
financial condition, human resources, and future economic environment with a long-term
view when they plan to acquire other firms.
The results of this study cautiously suggest that different-sector acquisitions may
be more beneficial than same-sector acquisition even though both types of transactions
led to negative accounting performances for up to 5 years. Therefore, if restaurant firms
need to grow faster for any strategic reason in spite of sacrificing their profit, they should
acquire restaurants in different sectors. In addition, this study implies that due diligence
procedures, deal types, and valuation of target firms are important; managers should
deliberately include bargaining factors during the deal negotiation process.

5.4

Research Limitations

This study is not free from limitations. First, the sample size is small. The results
may not be able to be generalized to other hospitality industries. Second, several
important factors such as the type of payment, dividends, stock splits, and the degree of
acquisition experience were not controlled in this study. Third, the debt situation when
restaurants made acquisitions was not considered. Thus, the effects of the acquisitions
may not have been clearly confirmed.
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Future studies should consider these limitations to advance understanding of
acquisitions by comparing various financing resources that may affect restaurant
performance after acquisitions in each sector in the restaurant industry. Such an
investigation would help restaurant executives find methods for positive abnormal returns
and significant profitability as well, thus improving their performance in terms of ROA
and ROE. Nevertheless, the results suggest that different types of acquisitions influence
restaurant firms’ performance differently.
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